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PROCEDUm ACT NOT

AP-

HEA NGs-After a hearing be-

fore postal officials the Postmaster General issued a fraud order against
the plaintiff who then sought to enjoin the Postmaster of Chicago from
carrying out the terms of the order. The district court dismissed plaintiff's complaint, and he appealed, relying on the fact that his hearing did
not conform to section 5c of the Administrative Procedure Act, which
forbids anyone acting as an investigator or prosecutor also to act as judge.1
The circuit court affirmed, holding that the Act was not applicable to Post
Office fraud order hearings because such a hearing was not required by
statute or judicial construction. Cates v. Haderlein, 189 F.2d 369 (7th
Cir. 1951).
Section 5 of the Administrative Procedure Act applies to ".
every case of adjudication required by statute to be determined on the
record after opportunity for an agency hearing
"
In Wong Yang
Sung v. McGrath3 the Supreme Court held that the application of section
5 to hearings required by statute did not exempt hearings held by compulsion but only those which an agency may hold by regulation, rule, custom,
or special dispensation. In that case an Immigration Service inspector
presided over the hearing in a case which was similar to cases he had investigated. The Court held that this proceeding was invalid because, since
it had been decided that deportation proceedings required a hearing in order
to comply with the due process requirement of the Constitution, 4 the hearings in deportation proceedings were held by compulsion and therefore
subject to the separation of functions provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act. In the case at hand the court relied on Public Clearing House
v. Coyne 5 to show that a fraud order hearing is not required by the compulsion of due process of law. In that case the Court held that the failure
to give a hearing in a fraud order case did not deprive the individual of
property without due process of law.
The Coyne case was decided on the premise that the use of the mails
was a privilege, but since that time it has come to be regarded as a right.6
1. 60 STAT. 237, 240, 5 U.S.C. §1004 (c) (1946) : ". . . No officer, employee,
or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for an
agency in any case shall, in that or in factually related cases participate or advise
in the decision. ...."
2. 60 STAT. 237, 240, 5 U.S.C. § 1004 (1946).
3. 339 U.S. 33, 50 (1949).
4. The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86 (1902) ; Kwock Jan Fat v. White,
253 U.S. 454 (1919); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 160 (1944) (concurring
opinion).
5. 194 U.S. 497, 508 (1903).
6. See Holmes' dissent in Leach v. Carlile, 258 U.S. 138, 141 (1922) ; dissent by
Brandeis in Milwaukee Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 430 (1921).
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Lower courts have concluded that the use of the mails is a right, and therefore a hearing in fraud order cases is required." The Court in the Coyne
case held that the lack of a hearing was not a violation of the Constitution
because the alleged defrauding party had recourse to the courts.8 It has
since been decided that, for some purposes, an appeal to the courts requires
an original hearing in the Post Office.9 The Supreme Court itself has
retreated from the language of the Coyne case in holding that proof of a
fraudulent purpose is essential, and that the one against whom the charge
of this fraudulent purpose is lodged must be given an opportunity to crossexamine witnesses on the vital issues.' 0 Certainly the right to crossexamine is meaningless unless there be some proceeding in which the right
can be exercised. The court in the principal case, by its narrow interpretation of the term "compulsion" in the Wong Yang Sung case, places the
defendant in a fraud order case in the position of one being judged by the
prosecuting attorney. Neither the Postmaster General nor any of the other
postal officials responsible for the issuance of a fraud order do any more
than rubber-stamp the findings of the Post Office investigat6r.1x The
monopolistic nature of the postal service demands at least an impartial de-,
cision when it will result in cutting off the individual from the principal
channel of business and social intercourse. Such a drastic effect emphasizes
the need for Post Office procedures that guarantee a fair hearing. It is
true that there is recourse to the courts, but such action places an almost
insurmountable burden of proof upon anyone seeking to upset a fraud
order.' 2 The full effect of this decision extends beyond the sphere of Post
Office fraud orders. For example, an application for a construction permit
under the Communications Act 13 can be granted or denied without a hearing, for the Act makes no mention of a hearing. Courts in certain instances
have held that a hearing was necessary, but whether that necessity falls
into the class delineated by the term compusion is as yet undecided. The
surprising result of the principal case is that it takes out of the coverage
of the Administrative Procedure Act an agency which has long been re4
garded as a sore-thumb example of the need for the Act.'
7. Pike v. Walker, 121 F.2d 37, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
8. 194 U.S. 497, 509 (1903).
9. Donnelly Mfg. Co. v. Wyman, 156 Fed. 415, 416 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1907).
10. Reilly v. Pinkus, 338 U.S. 269 (1949).
11. Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies, SEw. Doc. No. 186,
Part 12, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 33 (1940) : ". . . once the trial attorney reduces the
finding and decision to writing, mere inertia, if nothing else, may operate towards

their acceptance . . .the hearing officer, the chief attorney, the Assistant Solicitor,
the Solicitor, and the Postmaster General must all approve the decision, but again,
it is doubtful that (except in unusual cases) they will read the entire record or
bring a new approach to the resolution of the issues."
12. See Leach v. Carlile, 258 U.S. 138 (1922); Farley v. Heininger, 105 F.2d
79 (D.C. Cir. 1939) ; 'Appleby v. Cluss, 160 Fed. 984 (C.C. N.J. 1908).
13. 48 STAT. 1089-90 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 319 (1946).
14. See Davis, Separation of Functions in Administrative Agencies, 61 HARV. L.
REV. 389 (1948).
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BILLS AND NOTES-DUTIES ACCRUING TO BOTH BANK AND DEPOSITOR By VIRTUE OF FORGERY OF DEPOSITOR'S SIGNATURE-During
plaintiff's absence his stepson forged fifteen checks against plaintiff's ac-

count. When plaintiff discovered this, the stepson agreed to repay the
amount of the forgeries. The stepson later forged two more checks and
defaulted on his agreement, whereupon plaintiff had him jailed. Then,
approximately three months after he had first learned of the defalcations,
plaintiff notified the bank thereof. Plaintiff sued the bank for the amount
of all seventeen checks. Evidence showed that the bank perhaps suspected
the forgeries, since it allegedly returned the forged checks in a separate
envelope. The jury found for the plaintiff on the first fifteen checks, but
the trial court entered judgment n. o. v. for the bank upon a determination
that § 23 of the N.I.L. precluded plaintiff's recovery because he failed to
notify the bank promptly. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed
and held that the plaintiff was not precluded from recovery. Johnson v.
First National Bank of Beaver Falls, 367 Pa. 459, 81 A.2d 95 (1951).
There are two theories on which courts will deny recovery to victims
of forgery who delay or fail to notify their banks of the forgery. One is
that they have breached a contractual duty to notify which is imposed by
an implied term in the contract of deposit; 1 the other is that § 23 of the
N.I.L.2 estops them from asserting the false nature of the forged checks.
Whichever theory is used, it seems clear that drawers should be denied
recovery only to the extent that their delay or failure to notify has caused
the bank actual monetary loss. This is in keeping with the principles of
equitable estoppel and of liability for breach of contractual duty, and is the
majority view 4 It has also been held that banks have the burden of
proving this monetary damage.5 However, it has been the Pennsylvania
view that a depositor may not recover if he fails to give prompt notice to
the bank, even if no monetary damage was thereby incurred. 6 The theory
was that sufficient injury was sustained if the bank was prevented from
1. First National Bank of Birmingham v. Allen, 100 Ala. 476, 14 So. 335 (1893);
Critten v. Chemical National Bank, 171 N.Y. 219, 63 N.E. 969 (1902).
2. The Pennsylvania enactment of this law, PA. STAT. ANl. tit. 56, § 28 (Purdon,
1950), provides:
"When a signature is forged . . . it is wholly inoperative, and no right

. . . can be acquired through or under such a signature, unless the party
against whom it is sought to enforce such right is precluded from setting up the
forgery. . .

."

(Emphasis added).

3. Leather Manufacturer's Bank v. Morgan, 117 U.S. 96 (1886); First Nat.
Bank v. Wolfe, 140 Md. 479, 117 Atl. 898 (1922).
4. E.g., Janin v. London & S.F. Bank, 92 Cal. 14, 27 Pac. 1100 (1891) ; Murphy
v. Metropolitan Nat. Bank, 191 Mass. 151, 77 N.E. 693 (1906); Houseman-Spitzley
Corp. v. Bank, 205 Mich. 268, 171 N.W. 543 (1919); and authorities collected in
25 A.L.R. 177 (1923).
5. Hardy v. Chesapeake Bank, 51 Md. 562 (1879); Wind v. Fifth Nat. Bank,
39 Mo. App. 72 (1889).
6. E.g., Lesley V. Ewing, 248 Pa. 135, 93 Atl. 875 (1915) ; Connors v. Old Forge
Discount & Deposit Bank, 245 Pa. 97, 91 Atl. 210 (1914) ; Interstate Hosiery Mills,
Inc. v. First Nat. Bank of Lansdale, 139 Pa. Super. 181, 11 A.2d 537 (1939).
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7
The instant case held that the
proceeding promptly against the forger.
notice need only be "timely," not necessarily "prompt," 8 and allowed plain10
tiff to recover. 9 In the face of such clear pronouncements in former cases,
this action amounts to a reversal of the old Pennsylvania position, putting
it in line with the majority of states. 1
Requiring a depositor to give prompt notice at the risk of losing his
claim against the bank is inconsistent with both estoppel and contractual
duty theories and seems unsound. Mere delay in prosecuting forgers is
not a loss in itself, since forgers are criminals by definition and generally
have no tangible assets available for execution of a judgment. Unless the
2
bank can prove actual monetary damages due to a lack of notice,' it should
bear the loss caused by its cashing checks before the depositor knows of
Banks are insured against such losses, and any increase
the forgeries.'8
in insurance premiums sustained by them because of this burden is justified
since banks are in a better position than the depositor to detect the forgery
before payment. Consistent with the desire not to bestow an undeserved
windfall upon banks, the court in the instant case removed the stigma of
"prompt" from the required character of notice. However, "timely," the
substituted word, was not defined; in keeping with the stated policy, it
should mean "in time to prevent further loss to the bank." 14

7. Thus it was said in McNeely Co. v. Bank of North America, 221 Pa. 588,
594, 70 Atl. 891, 892 (1908) •
"When a depositor withholds from his bank his knowledge of the forgery,
he withholds from it this right to proceed promptly for its own protection. It
may or may not be able to recover from the forger by promptly proceeding
against him, but its right is to try by so proceeding."
8. "In view of the meaning judicially imputed to the word 'precluded', as employed in section 23 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, 'timely' rather than 'prompt'
more correctly defines the character of notice which a depositor is required to give
to his bank of a forged check charged to his account." Instant case at 463, 81 A.2d
at 97.
9. It is obvious that the bank would have been no better off with immediate
notice, since the first fifteen checks were cashed before plaintiff had knowledge, and
the insolvent forger is now in jail, where he would be if the bank had proceeded
against him promptly.
10.' See notes 6 and 7 supra.
11. This reverts the court to the position it took in Zell's Appeal, 103 Pa. 344
(1883), where it held that lack of prompt disclosure would not work an estoppel
where it was not shown that the holder of the forged note had suffered any detriment. That case has not been cited in succeeding cases on point, nor has an endeavor
ever been made to distinguish it.
12. This can be done by showing that the forger was solvent and in the jurisdiction before notice was given.
13. Critten v. Chemical National Bank, 171 N.Y. 219, 228, 63 N.E. 969, 972
(1902) :
"If the depositor has by his negligence in failing to detect forgeries in his
checks and give notice thereof caused loss to his bank, either by enabling the forger
to repeat his fraud or by depriving the bank of an opportunity to obtain restitution,
he should be responsible for the damage caused by his default, but beyond this his
liability should not extend."
14. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-506 (Proposed Final Draft No. 2, 1951):
"(1) Where a bank sends to its customer a statement of account accompanied
by items paid in good faith in support of the debit entries . . .
"(a) the customer must exercise reasonable care to . . . discover his unauthorized signature . . . and must notify the bank promptly after discovery
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The holding of the instant case is susceptible to the alternative interpretation that a bank must prove itself free from knowledge of a forgery
before it can set up the defense of lack of notice against the depositor. This
seems never to have been stated in Pennsylvania, 15 but it has ample authority in other jurisdictions.' 6 The principle is eminently fair since, if
the bank knows or should know that checks are being forged, no purpose is
served in requiring the depositor to give notice of the same fact. Each
of the alternative holdings is an improvement; both should be adopted.1'

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ComMERCE CLAUsE-NATURAL GAS ACTSTATE POWER TO REGULATE LOCAL DISTRIBUTION OF NATURAL GAS
INCLUDES POWER TO ]FORBID DIRECT INDUSTRIAL SALE BY INTERSTATE

PIPE LINE CoMPANY-Appellant company is engaged in the production
and interstate transportation by pipe line of natural gas. It sells largely
to local public utilities for resale, but also sells directly to some industrial
consumers. When appellant contracted to supply an industrial plant already served by a local public utility, the state public service commission,
pursuant to statutory authorization,' issued an order requiring appellant to
obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity before making the
sale. A state court enjoined the commission's order, but the state supreme
court reversed, affirming the order. 2 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court affirmed, holding that neither the commerce clause nor the
federal Natural Gas Act precluded a state regulation requiring a certificate
thereof; he is liable to the bank for any loss suffered by it which results from
his failure to do so. . . ." (Emphasis added).
This section retains the label "promptly," but it expressly reaches the same result
as the instant case.
15. The court says (instant case at 465, 81 A.2d 98):
"While a depositor's failure to give his bank timely notice that forged checks
have been charged against his account 'is a good defense . . . the bank has the
burden of proof,' Peoples City Bank v. John Hancock Mutual Insurance Company,
353 Pa. 123, 131, 44 A.2d 514, 518, 161 A.L.R. 1143, of its lack of knowledge in such
connection, free from any fault of its own." However, the last phrase is nowhere
to be found in the cited case which talks about the bank proving that it had not received prompt notice.
16. E.g., Basch v. Bank of America, 22 Cal.2d 316, 139 P.2d 1 (1943); Wussow
v. Badger State Bank, 204 Wis. 467, 234 N.W. 720 (1931); and see the excellent
discussion of this point in R. H. Kimball, Inc. v. Rhode Island Hospital Nat. Bank,
72 RI. 144, 153-154, 48 A.2d 420, 426 (1946).
17. As an alternative holding, the "timely notice" rule laid down in the instant
case could be considered mere dicta. However, it is significant to note that the issue
of the bank's previous knowledge of the forgeries was never presented to the jury.
The charge of the lower court excluded it [Record, pp. 135a-154a]. Therefore the
jury's verdict was based on an application of "wrong" Pennsylvania law. See the
opinion of the lower court in the instant case, 12 Beaver Co. L.J. (Pa. 1950). Instead
of sending the case back for jury consideration under a charge based on the second
interpretation, the appellate court let the verdict stand.
1. MicHf. Comp. LAws § 460.502 (1948).
2. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Michigan Public Service Comm., 328
Mich. 650, 44 N.W.2d 324 (1950).
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of public convenience and necessity for direct industrial sale of natural gas
by an interstate pipe line company. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Company v. Michigan Public Service Commission et al., 71 Sup. Ct. 777 (U.
S. 1951).
The instant case was decided in the face of commerce clause 3 objections, and with a view to previous decisions delimiting the area of state
regulation of matters "essentially local" in the natural gas industry. Wholesale distribution of natural gas in interstate commerce has been held to be
beyond the reach of state regulatory control,4 whereas local retail distribution of natural gas, even by extra-state companies, has been held to fall
within state control. 5 Neither the intent nor the effect of the federal
Natural Gas Act 6 altered this scope of state authority.7 The Supreme
Court had said that interstate sales of natural gas by pipe line direct to an
industrial consumer were subject to state regulation, at first only for the
purpose of requiring rate schedules to be filed,8 and later for the purpose of
actually determining the allowable rates.9 Not until the instant case has
the Court held, in effect, that a state can prohibit'0 an interstate sale of
natural gas as a valid means of regulation." In the past, a prohibition that
2
proved discriminatory against either extra-state natural gas companies '
or extra-state natural gas consumers Is has been held violative of the commerce clause, and in other fields state attempts to prohibit interstate commerce have been vehemently struck down, whether in protection of local
industry, 14 or in regulation of public health 15 or public highways. 1 There
is no indication, however, that the state commission's action in the instant
3. U.S. CoNsT. Art. III, § 8.

4. Missouri v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298 (1924).
5. Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm., 252 U.S. 23 (1920).

6. 52 STAT. 821 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717 (1946).
7. Illinois Natural Gas Co. v. Central Illinois Public Service Co., 314 U.S. 498
(1941) ; Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Commission of Indiana,
332 U.S. 507 (1947).
8. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Dept. of Public Utilities, 304 U.S. 61 (1938).
9. Panhandle v. Indiana, szpra note 7.
10. Although the Court states that the requirement of a certificate of public
convenience and necessity before entering a municipality already served by a public
utility is "regulation, not absolute prohibition," it admits that the end result might
be prohibition of a particular direct sale. Instant case at 781. The power to prohibit
an interstate sale is thus significantly afforded the state free from commerce clause
objections and subject only to due process limitations.
11. Cf. State ex re. Cities Service Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission, 337
Mo. 809, 85 S.W.2d 890 (1935) (where a state was held not to have jurisdiction
over a direct industrial sale interstate), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 65Z (1936).
12. West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911) (statute prohibiting
foreign corporations from transporting natural gas out of state).
13. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923) (statute prohibiting
shipment of natural gas out of state until demands of consumers within state are
met).
14. See Hood and Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
15. See Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 71 Sup. Ct. 295 (U.S. 1951).
16. See Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307 (1925). But cf. Clark v. Poor, 274
U.S. 554 (1927).
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case discriminates against extra-state natural gas companies or consumers,
17
nor could its regulation be in conflict with another state's regulation.
Control of local public utilities has been a traditional and essential
8
state governmental function. Providing for reasonable rates ' and adequate service '9 is a primary responsibility of state commissions to the consuming public unable to buy elsewhere. Each determination of public convenience or necessity by a commission hinges on numerous facts peculiar
to the local community, no matter where the gas or electricity comes from.
Retail gas distribution is certainly a matter of "essentially local" concern
sufficient to demand regulation in its local aspects of what has been designated "interstate commerce." 20 Volume industrial sales are inextricably
related to the whole scheme of distribution which brings natural gas to
domestic and institutional users, 21 since such sales both provide a balance to
the severe seasonable fluctuations in domestic needs and by their size reduce
unit costs to all consumers. Allowing interstate pipe lines to entice these
sales from local utilities or, at worst, to draw them outside state regulation, would imperil the existing scheme of regulated distribution. 22 The
power to protect a complex state rate structure by channeling gas through
existing public utilities capable of providing the service would seem as
necessary to effective state regulation as the power to control directly the
rates themselves. Factors making the natural gas industry inherently
monopolistic, such as the waste of duplicating facilities, the extremely high
fixed costs, the dependent position of the public, and the limited quantity
of the natural resource, likewise distinguish it from industries more amenable to competition within the same community, such as milk,23 and lead
to different regulatory considerations. Public utilities have an affirmative
duty to serve the public and are not simply private corporations affected
with a public interest that may be regulated for the public good.
In the instant case the Court recognized that "the statutory scheme
of 'dual regulation' might have some overlaps or conflicts." 24 The Court's
decision does pose a situation where federal regulation under the Natural
Gas Act apparently conflicts with state regulation permissible under the
same Act. Congress delegated to the Federal Power Commission the power
17. Cf. Buck v. Kuykendall, supra note 16.
18. Public Service Comm. v. Great Northern Utilities Co., 289 U.S. 130 (1932).
19. State ex rel. N.Y. & Queens Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm., 245 U.S. 337

(1917).

20. Cf. South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177
(1938) ; Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299 (U.S. 1851).
21. Instant case at 780; Panhandle v. Indiana, supra note 7, at 521n; Arkansas
Louisiana Gas Co. v. Dept., supra note 8, at 63.
22. See the discussion on regulation of the natural gas industry in Panhandle
v. Indiana, supra note 7, at 519-521.
23. See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, supra note 15; Hood and Sons v.
DuMond, supra note 14; Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511 (1934).
24. Instant case at 781.
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to regulate the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce 25 (as
distinct from the local distribution of natural gas for ultimate consumption).
The FPC had asserted authority to require a federal certificate for the extension of appellant company's pipe line on the same sale involved in the
instant case.26 The certificate was denied on the ground that appellant
27
company's pipe line system lacked adequate capacity to transport the gas.
Although the state commission has not yet been called upon to certify the
sale, it is readily foreseeable that national considerations of gas transportation might lead to conclusions quite different from those inspired by local
considerations of gas distribution. The effect of the instant decision, then,
is to require interstate pipe line carriers to obtain two certificates of public
convenience and necessity, if so demanded, first from the FPC and then
from the public service commission of the state where delivery takes place,
before they can sell natural gas direct to industrial users. It is unlikely
that the Court intended state regulation to override authorized federal
regulation, but, on the other hand, approval of the transportation by the
national agency cannot now override state prohibition of the distribution.
This cooperative regulation over all phases of the natural gas industry is
certainly within the purpose of the Natural Gas Act.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF RELIGION AND

PRESS-STATE CENSORSHIP OF MOTION PICTURES-The New York Board
of Regents revoked petitioner's license to exhibit the motion picture "The
Miracle" on the ground that it was a sacrilegious parody of the Immaculate

Conception. The Appellate Division upheld the banning of the picture,
denying that state censorship of motion pictures violates freedom of speech,
or that the New York statute 1 which bars licensing of sacrilegious pictures
impinges on freedom of religion, or that no enforceable meaning can be
given to the term sacrilege in the statute for the purpose of censorship.

Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 104 N.Y.S.2d 740 (1951).
2
Even since Mutual Film Corporation v. Industrial Commission
motion pictures have been classified as entertainment,3 and not subject to
25. 52 STAT. 821 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1946). In addition, this section of
the Act provides for the federal regulation of the sale in interstate commerce of
natural gas for resale and of natural gas companies engaged in such sale or in interstate transportation.
26. City of Detroit v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., 5 F.P.C. 43 (1946).
27. Id. at 50. Appellant has since reapplied to the FPC for a certificate, Re Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., F. P. C. Docket No. G-1417, pending at the time of
the instant decision.
1. N.Y. EDUCAT ON LAw § 122 (1927).

2. 236 U.S. 230 (1915).
3. ". . . the exhibition of moving pictures is a busiuiess pure and simple . . .
not to be regarded . . . as part of the press of the country or as organs of public
opinion. They are representations of events, of ideas and sentiment published and
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the freedom of speech clause in the Constitution. 4 Because of the increasing emphasis of motion pictures on social, political, and economic problems,
and the increasing effectiveness of self-regulation by the Hays Office, there
has been considerable criticism of the rule 5 and some dicta has set forth
the opposite view.0 Although the rule could be changed by the United
States Supreme Court,7 other courts have consistently upheld it 8 and
freedom of speech has not been extended to this medium. Religious freedom in the movies is on the same footing. The Supreme Court has construed the freedoms of speech and religion as protecting those who criticize, denounce, or attack other religions, 9 but the interweaving of the two
freedoms in this respect means that where freedom of speech is denied,
freedom to attack religions is similarly restricted. In this regard the instant
case is a logical corollary of the Mutual doctrine. 10
The extent to which courts have allowed state control of motion pictures by censorship boards has been great. In the Mutual case it was held
known, vivid, useful, and entertaining no doubt, but, as we have said, capable of
evil, having power for it, the greater because of their attractiveness and manner of
exhibition." Id. at 244 but note that at the time of this decision "the modern feature
was unknown. . . . Pictures were frequently made in a day at a cost of $500.
From an artistic standpoint they were crude since the modern techniques of film
making had not been developed." 60 YAIE L.J. 696, 705 n. 23 (1951).
4. U.S. CoNsT. AMEND. I.
5. For a recommendation that the constitutional issue be re-examined and that
censorship be limited to obscene pictures see Note, Film Censorship: An Administrative Analysis, 39 COL. L. Rxv. 1405 (1939) ; see also Note, Motion Pictures and
the First Amendment, 60 YALE L.J. 717, 718, 719 (1951), for a recommendation
that state censorship be controlled; see 36 CoRNEu L.Q. 273 (1951). For a brief
history of the controversial topic of motion picture censorship and an appraisal of
self-regulation see THE CoMIlSSION ON FaEDO OF THE PREss, FREEDOM OF THE
MoviEs (1947).
For a critically biased denunciation of picture censorship see
ERNST, THE FIRST FREEDOM, 181 (1946).
6 "We have no doubt that moving pictures, like newspapers and radio, are
included in the press whose freedom is guaranteed by the First Amendment ..
United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 136 (1948).
"The line between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the
protection of that [free press] basic right." Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510
(1948).
7. See Note, Motion Pictures and the First Amendment, 60 YALE L.J. 696, 702
n.15 (1951).
8 ". . . that, whatever individual judges may say in dissent, the court, as now
constituted vill not overrule, or in any manner depart from the holding in the Mutual
Film Corporation but will fully affirm it." RD-DR Corporation v. Smith, 183 F.2d
562 (5th Cir. 1950), cert. denied 340 U.S. 853 (1950).
9. "To persuade others to his own point of view the pleader, as we know, at
times, resorts to exaggeration, to villification of men who have been, or are, prominent
in church or state, and even to false statement. But . . . in spite of the probability
of excesses and abuses, these liberties are, in the long viev', essential to enlightened
opinion and right conduct on the part of the citizens of a democracy." Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1939) ; see also Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290
(1950), where the court held unconstitutional the revocation of a license to hold religious meetings on streets because appellant had ridiculed and denounced other religions in his meetings.
10. The court said in reference to freedom of religion, "However, motion pictures,
staged for entertainment purposes alone, are not within the category of inquiry and
discussion." Instant case at 744. It should be noted that the court exempts news,
educational, and scientific films. Instant case at 745.
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to be a lawful delegation of authority to permit the Ohio Industrial Commission to pass and approve only those pictures which are, in the discretion of the Commission, of a moral, educational, amusing or harmless character. The Supreme Court has also upheld a censorship statute which in
general terms provided that the censors could forbid pictures which ard
sacrilegious, obscene, indecent, or immoral or such as tend to corrupt
morals.,' The District Court in Connecticut upheld a statute permitting
the revocation of a license to show movies if the commissioner finds the
picture to be of a character which offends the racial or religious sensibilities of any element of society.12 The courts have consistently upheld the
banning by administrative boards of pictures on grounds of immorality,
indecency, obscenity or which tend to incite crime.13 At least two other
states have statutes permitting censors to ban sacrilegious pictures. 14
Although the instant case is the first in which a picture was banned
solely because it was found to be sacrilegious, the delegation of authority
involved is scarcely broader than in previous cases. Nevertheless, the instant case will increase the opportunity for the abuse of power which has
occurred in the past when state censors have banned on grounds of immorality pictures which a normal person would not consider immoral, and
when censors have used their power for political censorship. 15 To follow
the dictum of the instant case that all faiths are equally protected by the
statute, 16 it will be necessary for the censors to determine whether each
picture would be sacrilegious 17 to any one of the many religious bodies in
New York.' 8 In making this determination the censors would have to use
as many standards of sacrilege as there are religious bodies, a substantially
different task from determining what is immoral or obscene, for instance,
where generally the standard is what a reasonable man would consider
immoral. The obvious danger is that the Board will ban only pictures denounced as sacrilegious by highly organized, politically prominent religious
groups. 19 One is reminded of the blasphemy cases, under which only
11. Mutual Film Corporations of Missouri v. Hodges, 236 U.S. 248 (1914).
12. Fox Film Corporation v. Thrumbull, 7 F.2d 715 (D. Conn. 1925).
13. Note, 39 COL. L. REv. 1381 (1939).
14. P. . STAT. ANat. tit. 4, § 23 (Purdon, 1930); MD. CODE ANN. c. 66A, § 16
(Flack, 1939).
15. Note, supra note 13, at 1401.

16. Instant case at 744.
17. Defined as the "profanation of sacred things." Instant case at 744.
18. There are 265 religious bodies in the United States including, for example,
27,766,141 Roman Catholics, 10,474,695 Methodists, 5,000,000 Jewish, and smaller
sects including 2,916 members of the Mayan Temple, 2,905 congregations of Jehovah's
Witnesses, 4,489 members of the Baha'is, down to 30 members of the Vendanta
Society.
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New York undoubtedly has its pro-

portionate share of these diverse groups.
19. When the picture was shown it created a furor in several Roman Catholic
groups, was publicly denounced by the Church officials, and was picketed by the
Church members. It was after this that petitioner's license was revoked.
187 THE ATLANTIc MONTHLY 37 (April 1951).
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Christianity is protected from blasphemous denunciations. 20 At least the
blasphemy statutes had some justification constitutionally in that blasphemy
is more likely to disturb the peace.2 1 In permitting censorship of motion
pictures on the ground of sacrilege, the legislature is prohibiting the mere
expression of opinions, without regard to the malicious manner of their
presentation or the likelihood of disturbances of the peace. No distinction
is made between honest, artistic expression and uncouth, vulgar attacks
on religion. The banning of "The Miracle" underlines the necessity of some
control of motion picture censorship, either by a re-examination of the
Muttal doctrine in the light of the important position as a mode of expression now occupied by motion pictures or by a restriction of the area
of discretion delegated to censorship boards.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY WITHOUT
PROCESS or LAw-CAPTIVE AUDIENCE ON PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION

DUE

SysTEm-The Capital Transit Company, operator of steetcars and buses in
the District of Columbia, had installed in its vehicles FM radio receivers
through which music and commercial announcements were broadcast. After
the receipt of protests, the Public Utilities Commission of the District of
Columbia held a hearing. Pollak and others, who ride the vehicles of the
Transit Company, were allowed to intervene and took part in the hearing.
The Commission then stated in an order that transit radio is not inconsistent with public convenience, comfort, and safety,' A petition of appeal
from said order was dismissed by the District Court on the ground that no
legal right of the petitioners had been invaded. The Court of Appeals
reversed, holding that the broadcasts deprived objecting passengers of their
liberty, meaning their freedom not to listen, without due process of law.
Pollak et al. v. PUC, D.C. Cir., June 1, 1951.
There are two important problems presented by this decision, the
recognition of government action in this situation and the effect given to
the Constitutional guarantee of liberty. A finding of government action
was essential to allow the court to reach the Constitutional question, for
the Constitutional guarantees of liberty forbid only invasions of liberty by.
means of government action, not by private individuals. 2 The protection
also extends to cover action by government through one of its agencies. 3

20. Hartogenesis, Denial of Equal Rights to Religious Minorities and Nonbelievers in the United States, 39 YALE L.J. 659, 661 (1930).
21. Defined as "the malicious reviling of God or religion," (Peoples v. Ruggles,
8 Johns. 290, 292 (N.Y. 1911) blasphemy is a more vulgar, vociferous denunciation
of Christianity, hence is more likely to incite riots than is sacrilege, defined in the
instant case at 744 as "the profanation of sacred things."
1. Re Capital Transit Company, 81 P.U.R. (N.S.) 122 (1950).
2. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
3. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879).
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The instrumentality will be subject to Constitutional restraints when and
if it performs a function which is an integral part of the machinery of
government.4 Thus political parties have been held to be subject to Constitutional limitations on racial discrimination during their conduct of primary elections. 5 Moreover the actions of a private individual may become
government action when he has authority and status by virtue of government action. It has been so stated in cases involving the acts of exclusive
union bargaining agents whose power was the result of statutory creation. 6
Judicial enforcement of private restrictive covenants has been held to be
government action and forbidden by the Constitution. The contract is
not otherwise prohibited; it is the compulsion by the government that is
invalid. 7 The furnishing of public funds to finance a library created and
managed by private individuals pursuant to a private legacy has'been held
to make the administration of the library government action.8 Here
the court found government action by virtue of the fact that Capital Transit
was formed under an act and a joint resolution of Congress,9 and the franchise thus granted resulted in a virtual monopoly of the mass passenger
transportation business in the District of Columbia.' 0 The sanction of the
PUC was also an important factor in persuading the court that the broadcasts complained of were the result of government action.
Having found government action, the court held that Constitutional
guarantees of liberty embrace freedom from forced listening. At common
law, the source of the phrase "life, liberty or property without due process
of law", only freedom from physical restraint was meant." The meaning
12
of liberty has been expanded from those limits to include all civil rights.
The Supreme Court has found that the liberty contemplated by the Constitution is deemed to embrace the right of a citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties.' 3 This doctrine has principally been applied
in the economic area, where it has meant the right of a person to earn his
livelihood by any lawful means, but it has also been held to include the
right to teach a language other than English, on the theory that such a right
is essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.' 4 Although
4. Nixen v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1931).
5. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1943).
6. Steele v. Louisville and Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); American
Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
7. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
8. Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1945), cert. denied,
326 U.S. 711 (1945).
9. D.C. CODE § 43-503 (1940).
10. ". . . most government employees, in going to and returning from their
work, were compelled to begin or complete their trips by utilizing buses or streetcars
of Capital Transit." United States v. Capital Transit Co., 325 U.S. 357, 359 (1945).
11. Warren, The New Liberty Under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, 39 HARv. L. REv. 440 (1926).
12. GURmux, THE FOURTEENTH ARTIcLE OF AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION
109 (1898).
13. See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897).
14. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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the instant case is the first to recognize freedom of attention as a Constitutional right, the right to be free of sound broadcasts by another has been
recognized in tort actions in the case of one at home,' 5 or at his place of
business,' 6 under the law of nuisance. The interest in protecting unwilling
listeners has also been held important in the banning of loud and raucous
17
sound trucks in public streets.
The fear has been expressed that holding an action by a private company to be government action because it is enfranchised by Congress and
subject to control by a government commission, will go far in subjecting
not only public utilities, but all individuals, to the limitations on government.18 The case does not, however, go so far. The operations of an
agency may be deemed to be government action for purposes of the protection of the Constitutional rights of the people affected by it, but not necessarily for other purposes. This case will serve to give notice to those who
for their own advantage open their property to public use that the greater
the public use, the more the owners' rights are modified by the Constitutional rights of those who use it. 19 Although the finding of government
action here may seem tenuous, it is essential in a, day of expanding influence
and control by the government over the individual that the protection
against indirect oppressive government action be extended to the numerous
agencies and authorities which are not subject to popular election but
derive their power from statutes enacted by elected representatives of the
people.
As to the effect given to the meaning of liberty, it is another manifestation of the remarkable efficacy of the Constitution in keeping up with
new developments in our complex modern society.2 ° Whether it is possible
for a person to put the sound from his mind and not be forced to listen
is a troublesome quesfion of fact. Even if it is possible to dismiss the interference from the mind there is certainly some discomfort, and the sense
of outrage at being subjected to the broadcasts is perhaps just as important
a consideration. The liberty of the mind is as essential to free men as the
freedom from physical restraint.
15. Fox v. Thomassie, 26 So.2d 402 (La. App. 1946).
16. Stoddard v. Rosen Talking Machine Co., 241 Mass. 245, 135 N.E. 251 (1922).
17. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (A municipal ordinance was held
valid despite the fact that it entailed a limitation on the freedom of speech). In the
principle case the contention that the freedom of speech of the broadcasters was curtailed is untenable. The only broadcasting which the court held to be forbidden by
the Constitution was commercial announcements. The Constitution does not protect
commercial advertising. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
18. See Shipley, Some Co2stitutional Aspects of Transit Radio, 11 FED. Comm.
B.J. 150 (1950).
19. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946) (Company town held just as
limited by Constitutional guarantees of liberty as a regularly organized municipality).
20. Some unique ramifications of the case are suggested by the New York City
Municipal Court, which allowed recovery in an action by one motorist against another for blocking his car by double parking. The court said "If a 'captive audience'
has the right to complain of its plight and to pray for relief, so also may a 'captive
motorist'." The New York Court cited the principle case. Harnik v. Levine, 20

L.W. 2076 (N.Y. City Mun. Ct., Aug. 9, 1951).
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-STANDING TO SUE-ORGANIZATION BLACKLISTED BY ATTORNEY GENERAL MAY CHALLENGE THE LISTING-Petitioner, an unincorporated charitable association, sought injunctive relief
against the ex parte action of the Attorney General who, acting pursuant
to the authority bestowed upon him by Executive Order 9835, had designated the association "Communist." ' The sole alleged use of this information was to aid the government in ridding itself of disloyal employees.
Petitioner had been given no notice of any proceedings against it, nor had
any hearing in fact been held. Petitioner asserted that this action had
deprived it of valuable property rights,2 and alleged its nature was charitable relief work, although it did not specifically deny that it was within
any classification of the Executive Order.3 The Attorney General filed
a motion to dismiss, thus admitting the allegations of the complaint. The
Supreme Court, reversing the District and Circuit Courts, held that petitioner had standing to challenge the designation. 4 Joint Anti-Fascist Refu-

gee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
Under Article III of the Constitution a federal constitutional court
may review administrative action only where a "case" or "controversy" is
presented. Such courts are forbidden to decide issues which are hypo-

thetical," academic, 6 moot,1 or unsusceptible of specific relief through a
decree of a conclusive character, 8 to act in the absence of authority to give
a binding judgment, 9 or to render advisory opinions. 10 The Court in the
past has refused to review executive action of a political nature 1 or action
by a cabinet officer acting under executive orders.' 2 Likewise the correctness of administrative advice has been held free from judicial review. 13
1. Other classifications include "Totalitarian," "Fascist, .... Subversive," "Organizations which have adopted a policy of advocating or approving the commission
of acts of force and violence to deny others their rights under the Constitution of the
United States," and "Organizations which seeks to alter the form of government
of the United States by unconstitutional means." 5 CODE FED. R. s. §210.11(6)
(1949).
2. The alleged deprivations were (1) loss of membership, (2) loss of income tax
exemption, (3) inability to obtain new members and meeting places, and (4) loss of
contributors.
3. The two petitioners whose cases were joined for purposes of decision did
specifically deny that they were within the group designated by the Attorney General.
Those organizations were the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, Inc.
and the International Workers Order, Inc.
4. The Court also held that a hearing must be given to petitioners either before
the designation, or thereafter through judicial review, under the requirements of the
due process clause. A discussion of this point has been omitted from the comment.
5. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
6. Hicklin v. Coney, 290 U.S. 169, 172-73 (1933).
7. United States v. Alaska S.S. Co., 253 U.S. 113 (1920).
8. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 241 (1937).
9. Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 697 (1864) ; and cf. Chicago & S. Air Lines
v. Waterman Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1947).
10. See Frankfurter, Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 HARV. L. REv. 677 (1933).
11. Cf. Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1947).
12. Cf. Decatur v. Paulding, 14 Pet. 497 (U.S. 1840); Keim v. United States,
177 U.S. 290 (1899).
13. NWLB v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 145 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1944), cert. denied,
324 U.S. 856 (1945).
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It has been recognized that reports of the President's intelligence services
"(are not and ought not to be published to the world." 14 Because an action
of an administrative agency occasions even irreparable loss does not in
itself afford grounds for judicial review.15 Further, the courts have re6
fused to review an administrative statement of no immediate effect 1 or
statements of policy. 17 The Court has, however, allowed judicial review
where a legally protected right has been violated.' 8 Although a legally
protected right has never been defined precisely by the Court, it is a necessary incident before a party may have standing. 19 A factor in determining whether such a right exists is the severity of harm caused by the challenged action. In the instant case the designation caused severe harm,
i.e., the withdrawing of membership and support not only by federal employees, but by others as well, and in practical effect the destruction of
petitioner as an organization. The Court relied on Columbia Broadcasting
System v. United States, 20 where the Federal Communications Commissioner declared that all networks having a certain provision in their contracts with member stations would not have their licenses renewed, and
standing to sue was allowed on the ground that this was more than a mere
statement of policy, and directly determinative of rights in the future so
as to destroy valuable property then existing. Other cases relied on by
the majority, Pierce v. Society of Sisters2 1 and Truax v. Raich,2 appear
similar. In these cases standing to sue was granted because of an exercise
of improper powers which would operate to curtail future business benefits.
In the present case there was likewise an allegation of an invalid exercise
of administrative power with the resulting destruction of major economic
interests. But in the cited cases the challenged governmental action was
the exercise of regulatory power over private business, whereas the Excutive Order here was a matter of internal government management.
By strict interpretation, it is difficult to see how the instant case differs
from those cases which have denied judicial review. National security
14. See Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1947).
15. See Standard Scale Co. v. Farrell, 249 U.S. 571 (1919), and the dissent of
Justice Frankfurter in Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States, 316 U.S. 407,
429 (1942).
16. United States v. Los Angeles & S.L.R. Co., 273 U.S. 299 (1927).
17. Standard Scale Co. v. Farrell, 249 U.S. 571 (1919).
18. See Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 479 (1937) ; Sprunt & Son
v. United States, 281 U.S. 249 (1930).
19. The justices' points of view of the legally protected right in question were (1)
Burton-to be free from libel arising out of unauthorized power, (2)' Frankfurterto be free from name calling, where it results in consequential damage to property
(3) Douglas-agreed with Burton, (4) Black-to be free of government name calling
entirely, and (5) Jackson-freedom from name calling where it affects the members
of the organization directly.
20. 316 U.S. 407 (1942).
21. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
22. 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
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was the only reason for the issuance of the executive order.23 The Attorney
General's designation had no direct effect in so far as it subjected petitioner neither to criminal or civil penalties, immediate or postponed, nor
to the contingency of future administrative action. It had application only
to government employees. But the majority of the Court looked to the
practical effects of such a designation. With world conditions as they exist
today, calling an organization "Communist" seriously curtails its activities,
if it does'not proscribe them completely. Serious loss of prestige and the
inability to obtain contributions, the lifeblood of petitioner, had resulted.
Existing property rights had thus been affected. The Court found that
this was a violation of petitioner's legally protected right to continue its
operations, and was not one damnum absque injuria. This conclusion was
necessary since it had earlier been decided that employees who were being
discharged could not challenge the Attorney General's determination, although this determination was a factor to be considered by the Loyalty
Review Board in the discharge 2 4 Neither could the Loyalty Review Board
question the determination. 25 Therefore petitioner was the only one remaining who could challenge.
This decision establishes that executive action, or advice to the executive by a cabinet member, will no longer be absolutely immune from court
review. Nor will the factors of internal security and the necessity of maintaining certain information secret insure immunity. When present political
attitudes are examined the practical effects of the "blacklist" 26 on petitioner's future operation are manifest. In such circumstances amenities
should be overlooked. Invalid action by an administrative body which collaterally results in a destruction of the future operation of any organization
should be reviewable. In this area the means through which this harm is
brought about should be immaterial, whether in the internal management of
government or in the regulation of private business. A boycott through
public opinion is actually more direct than many so-called direct infringements upon private rights. The Court in allowing judicial review in the
present case recognized this fact, and in effect balanced the degree and
directness of the harm against the factors of executive immunity and internal security. While future decisions will depend upon the individual
determination of the justices,2 7 where the extent of deprivation of opportunities is great the courts will probably allow judicial review. That this
harm occurs in a collateral manner will be immaterial, where occasioned
directly by the action of an administrative official.
23. Executive Order 9835, stating "maximum protection must be afforded the
United States against infiltration of disloyal persons into the ranks of its employees. .. . .
24. Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), affirmed (by an equally
divided court without opinion), 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
25. See Loyalty Review Board, Memorandum No. 2, March 9, 1948.
26. New York Times, December 5, 1947, p. 1, col. 4.
27. The instant case produced a split both in the circuit court [177 F.2d 79
(D.C. Cir. 1949)], and in the Supreme Court where there were five separate concurring opinions.
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FEDERAL JURISDICTION-REmOVAL-SEPARABLE

CONTROVERSY

RE-

ACTION-After her
house burned down, Mrs. Finn brought suit in a Texas state court against
two non-resident insurance companies and an individual resident of Texas,
agent for both companies. Defendant American Fire and Casualty Company, a Florida corporation, had the case removed to a United States District Court because of diversity of citizenship between it and the plaintiff.
The District Court rendered a judgment on the merits against American
and for the other defendants. American's motion for vacation of the judgment, on the ground that the suit was not removable under the 1948 Judicial Code,' was denied. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 2 The Supreme
Court reversed and ordered the cause remanded to the District Court with
directions to vacate the judgment, on the ground that no separate and independent cause of action had been stated against American and that therefore, under § 1441(c), there never had been a right of removal. American
Fire and Casualty Co. v. Finn, 71 Sup. Ct. 534 (1951).
Right to remove actions from a state court to a federal court in diversity cases involving both resident and non-resident defendant has been
restricted by § 1441(c) of the 1948 Judicial Code. Under the prior
statute,3 right of, and limitations upon, removal were categorized as follows:
(1) there was a non-separable controversy when resident and non-resident
defendants were indispensable parties, e.g., when their liability was joint,
and non-resident had no right to remove any part of the action from a
PLACED BY SEPARATE AND INDEPENDENT CAUSE OF

state court; (2) there was a separable controversy when resident and nonresident were permissively joined, e.g., when their liability was several or
in the alternative, and non-resident could remove the entire action; (3)
there was a separate controversy when two causes of action were joined,
one against a resident, the other against a non-resident, and the latter
could have his portion of the action removed to a federal court, while the
other cause remained in the state court. This "separable controversy"
statute had become immersed, through judicial invention, in a morass of
confusion 4 Furthermore, the splitting of a "separate controversy" between
federal and state courts was subject to criticism. The necessity for having
more than one trial even when the controversies had common major issues
often defeated the purposes of the liberal joinder provisions enacted by
many. of the states and permitted by the Federal Rules of Procedure. In
1. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441 (c) (1950): "(c) Whenever a separate and independent
claim or cause of action, which would be removable if sued upon alone, is joined with
one or more otherwise non-removable claims or causes of action, the entire case may
be removed and the district court may determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion, may remand all matters not otherwise within its original jurisdiction."
2. 181 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1950).
3. 28 U.S.C. §71 (1946): "And when in any suit mentioned in this section
there shall be a controversy which is wholly between citizens of different States, and
which can be fully determined as between them, then either one or more of the defendants actually interested in such controversy may remove said suit into the district court of the United States for the proper district."
4. See Note; 41 HARv. L. REv. 1048 (1928).
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enacting the new removal statute, Congress was motivated by two purposes:
(1) to avoid the difficulties and weakness of the old statute; (2) to limit
removal from state courts in order to keep the federal dockets clearer.5
Section 1441(c) eliminates the "separable controversy" as a basis for removal. Instead, it allows a non-resident to remove only when there is a
"separate and independent claim or cause of action" against him. It differs
from the previous "separate controversy" provision in that it permits all
of the separate causes to be removed and litigated together at the discretion
of the federal district judge. However, although there now seems little
justification for the fear that out-of-state defendants will be penalized in
state courts," the Revisers were unwilling to go so far as to limit right of
7
removal to complete diversity.
It is perhaps too early to determine whether the purposes of the new
statute will be effected. It is certain that the present Act was not intended
8
to be a mere paraphrase of the old, with all of the old difficulties remaining.
Although it is evident that fewer actions can now be removed, the new
statute will probably not substantially reduce the load of federal courts
inasmuch as suits which contain separate causes may now be removed
in their entirety in contradistinction to the old rule that separate controversies be split"up. The danger of the statute is that the new basis of
removal, i.e., separate and independent claim or cause of action, will, like
its predecessor, emerge as a shadowy, unworkable formulation, incapable
of exact understanding. If this be so, then the new rule will lead only to
harassment of litigants, costly trials and appeals, and another morass of
confusion. The instant case serves as a warning of this possibility: nearly
three years after the fire loss, Mrs. Finn, who began her action in a state
court and wanted it to remain there, but nonetheless won in the federal
court, found herself back in the state court with the entire action waiting
to be litigated anew. This unfortunate result would have its merits had
the Court been able to announce a clear rule that would enable others to
understand the meaning of "separate and independent cause of action."
It did not do so. Perhaps the words "cause of action" defy exact definition.
Indeed, the concept is given different meanings in different situations. 9
The Court, in announcing an "accepted definition," defined a cause of action
5. See Reviser's Note reprinted at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441 (1950). With respect
to limiting the right of removal, see revision notes, p. 3: "Subsection (c) permits the
removal of a separate cause of action but not of a separable controversy unless it
constitutes a separate and independent claim or cause of action within the original
jurisdiction of United States District Courts. In this respect it will somewhat decrease the volume of Federal litigation."
6. See Wechsler, Federal Jurisdictim and Revision of the Judicial Code, 13
LAw & CONTEMP. PROD. 216 (1948), and Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal
Judicial System, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PRo& 3 (1948).
7. See MooRE, COmmENTARY ON THE JUDIcIAL CODE 239 (1949).
8. Cf. MOORE, COMMENTARY ON THE JUDIcAL CODE 238 (1949) : "So that the old
separable controversy wine will not be served under the new label, courts must
give a broad meaning to cause of action."
9. See 2 Moom FEDERAL PRAcTICE 359-388 (1948).
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as the violation of a single primary right.10 This is fundamentally a different definition from the one often advanced, that a cause of action be considered an aggregate of operative facts which the lay mind would unhesitatingly group together." Undoubtedly, if the courts are to follow Congress' objective to abridge the right of removal, they must give "cause
of action" just such a broad interpretation. Although some recent cases
involving § 1441(c) have correctly refused to allow removal in situations
where the right to remove would have been granted under the old statute,1 2 the courts have seemed preoccupied with whether defendants' liability
was joint or several. The new statute has been oriented towards joinder of
causes, not joinder of parties. The failure of the Court to give a definitive
standard for interpreting § 1441(c) makes it all the more likely that cases
like the instant one will reoccur. In view of the fact that § 1441(c) seems
capable of as little certainty of interpretation as the old Act, three possible
remedies should be considered: (1) amend the Act to allow removal only
when there is complete diversity between plaintiffs and defendants; (2)
estop a defendant who has removed from challenging the federal court's
jurisdiction over him; Is (3) refuse to review removals to district courts
unless there has been an abuse of discretion, a course which would prevent
the evils of the Finn case, but which would sacrifice uniformity.

HABEAS CORPUS-STATE CONVICTION VOID FOR WANT OF DUE
PROCESS IF JURISDICTION OVER PRISONER WAS ACQUIRED IN VIOLATION
OF FEDERAL STATUTE AGAINST KIDNAPPING-Shirley Collins, imprisoned

for murder by a Michigan court, filed a petition for habeas corpus in a
federal district court alleging that his conviction was void for want of
jurisdiction because Michigan police had violated the Lindbergh law I in
carrying him from Illinois to Michigan for trial. The district court dismissed the petition on the ground that petitioner's presence in the trial
court gave it jurisdiction over his person regardless of how such presence
was obtained. Collins then appealed to the circuit court which held thai
10. Quoting Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316 (1927), the Court
said: "'Upon principle, it is perfectly plain that the respondent suffered but one
actionable wrong and was entitled to but one recovery, whether his injury was due
to one or the other of several distinct acts of alleged negligence or to a combination
of some or all of them. In either view there would be but a single wrongful invasion of a single primary right of the plaintiff, namely, the right of bodily safety,
whether the acts constituting such invasion were one or many, single or complex.
"'A cause of action does not consist of facts, but of the unlawful violation of a
right which the facts show.'" For a criticism of this definition, see Clark, The
Cause of Action, 82 U. OF PA. L. REv. 354, 355 (1934).
11. See CLARx, CODE PLEADING 137-148 (1947).

In either the Court's view or

Clark's, there was only one cause of action in the instant case.
12. E.g., Butler Mfg. Co. v. Wallace & Tiernan Sales Corp., 82 F. Supp. 635
(W.D. Mo. 1949), Mayflower Industries v. Thor Corp., 184 F.2d 537 (3d Cir. 1950).
13. This solution was advanced by the minority decision in the instant case.
1. 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1946).
crime.

The statute makes interstate kidnapping a federal
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the allegations were sufficient to constitute a denial of due process and remanded the case for a determination of the facts. Collins v. Frisbie;189
F.2d 464 (6th Cir. 1951).
The circuit court's decision is unorthodox in both its procedural and
substantive aspects. While federal courts possess the power to release
prisoners held in violation of the Contitution, laws, and treaties of the
United States, 2 it is established through precedent that considerations of
comity require them to refuse to entertain applications for habeas corpus
until the petitioner has exhausted every remedy available to him in the
state court.3 Recently Darrv. Burford 4 decided that a denial of a petition
for certiorari by the Supreme Court is also a condition precedent to a writ
of habeas corpus from a district court. It is recognized, however, that
exceptional circumstances may occasionally warrant departures from these
strict procedural requirements. 5 In the present case petitioner did not raise
the matter of his kidnapping either at his trial or on appeal. During the
eight years of his incarceration he had on several occasions applied for
relief to the Supreme Court of Michigan, but had never presented this
precise issue which apparently he still may do. No petition for certiorari
has ever been filed. On those facts, the holding of the circuit court that
exceptional circumstances required prompt federal intervention 6 is surprising, for nothing uncommon is mentioned to justify it beyond the conduct
of certain district courts of that circuit which in similar cases have rendered
decisions inconsistent with the clearly expressed views of their circuit
court. 7 On the whole there seems to be much force in the argument of
the dissenting opinion that the petitioner who has failed to indicate conditions of peculiar urgency or to explain his eight year delay should therefore
be referred to the customary procedure. 'This is particularly so since the
great bulk of federal habeas'corpus petitions fail to sustain their allegations.8
The principal case in its substantive aspects is at variance with an old
line of Supreme Court cases, 9 and with numerous recent decisions in circuit
2. 28 U.S.C. §2241 (Supp. 1950).
3. See, e.g., Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944) ; Mooney v. Holohan, 294
U.S. 103 (1935). The exhaustion principle is now part of the Judicial Code, 28
U.S.C. § 2254 (Supp. 1950).
4. 339 U.S. 200 (1950).
5. See, e.g., Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 116 (1944) ; Kennedy v. Taylor, 269
U.S. 13, 18 (1925); United States ex rel. Auld v. Warden of New Jersey State
Penitentiary, 187 F.2d 615 (3d cir. 1951).
6. The court recommended that this case be expedited by petition for certiorari
to the Supreme Court for review, and thus seems to indicate that in this instance it
considers the settlement of the substantive problem more important than strict observance of the customary procedure. Petition for Certiorari docketed, 20 U.S.L.
WEEK 3067 (U.S. Sep. 25, 1951).
7. Compare Ex parte Brown, 90 F. Supp. 50 (1950), and Hatfield v. Warden of
State Prison, 88 F. Supp. 690 (1950), with Brownt v. Frisbie, 178 F.2d 271 (6th
Cir. 1949).
8. Parker, Limiting The Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171 (1948).
9. Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U.S. 192 (1906); Cook v. Hart, 146 U.S. 183
(1892) ; Mahon v. Justice, 127 U.S. 700 (1888) ; Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
Since no federal issue was seen, it was immaterial whether the question was raised
before trial, or after conviction either directly or collaterally.

19511

RECENT CASES

courts, which have held that the criminal jurisdiction of a court is not impaired by the manner in which the accused is brought before it,1O though
no other case has expressly considered the effect of a violation of the Lindbergh law. These decisions have restricted the scope of due process to
proper indictment and trial procedure. Since the kidnapping was thought
to raise no federal question, the extent to which it could be set up
against the right of the state to try the accused was reserved to the discretion of the state courts."' It is on the federal question raised by the
violation of the Lindbergh law that the instant case has sought to distinguish
the earlier decisions. Though the concept of due process has been vitalized
in recent years,' 2 it is none the less clear that the infringement of a federal
statute in the course of a criminal prosecution will not necessarily void
the proceedings.' 3 For example, the requirement of due process does not
prohibit the use in state courts of evidence obtained in violation of the
federal communications act.' 4 It was also decided in Wolf v. Colorado,15
that while the constitutional prohibition of unreasonable search and seizure
was applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, due
process did not require state courts to exclude evidence thus illegally obtained. The majority felt that the activities proscribed by the Fourth
Amendment could be prevented by other remedial devices than the exclusion of the tainted evidence. The Wolf case offers a close analogy to
0
the problem presented here.' "Implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" 17
is an absence of police abductions, yet when a prisoner's guilt has been ascertained in a fair trial, irregularities in bringing him before the court seem
insufficient to warrant a new trial. The same civil and criminal sanctions
available for redress in cases of illegal search and seizure are available to
meet this abuse. Though these sanctions have been criticized as ineffective
10. See, e.g., McMahan v. Hunter, 150 F.2d 498 (10th Cir. 1945) ; Hall v. Johnston, 86 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1936) ; United States ex rel. Voight v. Toombs, 67 F.2d
744 (5th Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 291 U.S. 686 (1934).
11. Mahon v. Justice, 127 U.S. 700, 707 (1888); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436,
440, 444 (1886). The dissent in the Mahon case, the first to consider interstate kidnapping, in an argument that would find more support today, reasoned that the extradition provision, U.S. CoNsT. Art. IV, § 2, made this a federal issue.
12. See Note, 61 HARV. L. Rv. 657 (1948).
13. In Robinson v. United States, 144 F.2d 392 (1944), the sixth circuit has itself
held that jurisdiction is not impaired by extradition proceedings in contravention of
the removal statutes.
14. Leon v. State, 180 Md. 279, sub. ton. Hubin v. State, 23 A.2d 706 (1942),

cert. denied sub nor. Neal v. State, 316 U.S. 680 (1943).
15. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
16. In Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 596 (1904), the similarity of the problem in these two areas was recognized. Since, in the Wolf case, state practice was
thought relevant to the reasonable requirements of due process, it may be a significant
factor in the present case that every state which has considered the question except
Kansas holds that criminal jurisdiction is unaffected by the manner in which it was
obtained. See 165 A.L.R. 947 (1946).
17. The phrase is Justice Cardozo's formulation of the meaning of due process,

Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
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since they fail to remove the incentive for illegality,' 8 the widespread adoption of statutes authorizing arrest on fresh pursuit into another state,19 and
the relative simplicity of extradition, already leave little incentive for police
kidnappings. Moreover, should this problem become acute, the federal
government is here, as it was not in the Wolf situation, in a position to
deter effectively such conduct by prosecutions under existing laws. The demands of due process as to the fairness of the trial itself can hardly be
overstressed, 20 but the manner in which the accused is obtained for trial
is less significant if the paramount concern is a just determination of the
issue of guilt. Whether or not due process should require that irregularities
in procuring the prisoner be made available to him at trial as a plea in
abatement is a complex question entailing not only the difficult determination of what is the most desirable state policy in this respect, but also a
decision as to the latitude the federal system gives a state to pursue its
own imperfect course. However that question may be resolved, it is submitted that when this issue is not raised in the course of a proper trial, it
should not be available at a later date to upset the conviction.

INSURANcE-EmPLOYER'S LIABILITY POLICY-SLANDER AS AN AcPERSONAL INJURY-A hotel employee recovered a judgment
against his employer for damages for slander by its agent. Judgment was
paid by the employer, which then brought action against its insurer to recover the amount paid in satisfaction of the judgment. The policy was a
"Workmen's Compensation and Employer's Liability Policy," one insuring
clause providing for coverage in accordance with the state Workmen's Compensation Act and another for indemnity against loss of damages for personal injuries accidentally sustained by insured's employees. Stating that
the workmen's compensation clause need not be considered, the court held
that the policy indemnified the employer against loss resulting from an
adverse judgment for slander, that damage to character or reputation as
a result of slander is a "personal injury," and that the injury in the instant
case was sustained by reason of an "accident." St. Francis Hotel v. Industrial Indemnity Co., No. 270,005, San Francisco Munic. Ct. (1951).
This is apparently the first instance where a court has been called upon
to determine whether or not defamation is an "accidental personal injury"
CIDENTAL

18. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 42 (1949) (Justice Murphy's dissent).
The civil sanction will be proportionately more effective in abduction cases since the
probable recovery is greater, but in that rare case in which the extradition might have
been denied, civil redress is inadequate.
19. See Note, 31 MINN. L. Rxv. 699 (1948).
20. The Supreme Court has manifested increasing concern with this problem.
Inter alia, due process has been held to require that the accused be provided with
counsel, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), or intelligently waive counsel,
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), and it forbids convictions through perjury,
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935), third degree confessions, Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949), and mob dominated trials, Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S.

309 (1914).
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for purposes of insurance coverage. It is well established that in certain
contexts "personal injury" is a broader term than "bodily injury", and
as such has been held to cover, in an insurance policy, loss of wages, hospital
expenses, and loss of wife's services. 2 Similarly, "personal injury" has
been held to include the damage to character or reputation resulting from
slander or libel, though apparently the question has been considered heretofore only in determining the meaning of the term as employed in statutory language 3
As to the meaning of "accidental," it was early said that in insurance
policies the word is used in its "ordinary, popular sense, as meaning unexpectedly taking place . ." 4 This definition presented the courts with
the problem, unexpected by whom? The present majority rule, established
by the Mississippi Court in 1930, 5 is that an injury, however intentionally
inflicted, is "accidental" or not depending on the viewpoint of the person
injured.6 Thus, in an action on a third-party liability policy, a person intentionally assaulted has been held to be the victim of an "accidental injury," and the policy to cover the employer's liability, so long as the employer did not perform the act or sanction it.7 Logically, the same rule
is applied where the "accident" is caused by mere negligence, whether the
employer 8 or a third party 9 is negligent. By a process of applying legal
definitions the court reached the conclusion that, since the damages resulting from slander by employer's agent were "accidental" from the viewpoints of both the slandered employee and the employer, the result was an
"accidental personal injury" under the terms of the policy. The court
might have further supported its holding by citing the rule that, where provisions of a policy are subject to two or more interpretations, that which
is adverse to the insurance company must prevail. 10
1. BLAcK's LAW

DIctIONARY

967

(3d ed. 1933).

2. Nuzzi v. U.S. Casualty Co., 121 N.J.L. 249, 1 A.2d 890 (1938) ; Gaouette
v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 253 App. Div. 388, 2 N.Y.S.2d 497 (2d Dep't. 1938).
3. Houston Printing Co. v. Dement, 18 Tex. Civ. App. 30, 44 S.W. 558 (1898)
(survival of causes of action for personal injuries) ; Brewster v. Baker, 139 S.W.2d
643 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940)

(requirement that notice of damages for personal in-

juries be given to the city within a specified time) ; Thompson v. Judy, 169 Fed. 553
(6th Cir. 1909) (release by bankruptcy from all debts except judgments for wilful

and malicious injury to the person); Sanderson v. Hunt, 116 Ky. 435, 76 S.W. 178
(1903) (same); McDonald v. Brown, 23 RI. 546, 51 Atl. 213 (1902) (same).
4. Mutual Accident Association v. Barry, 131 U.S. 100, 121 (1888).
5. Georgia Casualty Co. v. Alden Mills, 156 Miss. 853, 127 So. 555 (1930).,
6. Woodhead, Insurance Against the Consequences of Wilful Acts, [1948] INs.

L.J. 867, 878.
7. Georgia Casualty Co. v. Alden Mills, supra note 5; E. J. Albrecht Co. v.
Fidelity and Casualty Co., 289 Ill. App. 508, 7 N.E.2d 626 (1937) (shooting by
construction superintendent); Fox Wisconsin Corp. v. Century Indemnity Co., 219
Wis. 549, 263 N.W. 567 (1936) (assault by theater usher). But cf. De Luca v.
Coal Merchants Mutual Insurance Co., 59 N.Y.S.2d 664 (Sup. Ct. 1945) (assault by
manager and president of corporation in line of duty held not "accidental").
8. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pioneer Seafoods Co., 116 F.2d 38 (9th Cir. 1940).
9. Wisconsin Transportation Co. v. Great Lakes Casualty Co., 241 Wis. 523, 6

N.W.2d 708 (1942).

10. General Insurance Co. of America v. Pathfinder Petroleum Co., 145 F.2d 368
(9th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 844 (1945); Island v. Firemen's Fund Indemnity Co., 30 Cal.2d 541, 184 P.2d 153 (1947).
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But in arriving at its conclusion the court seems to have overlooked a
basic rule clearly applicable here: an insurance policy should be so construed as to ascertain and carry out the mutual intention of the parties
thereto as it appears from the language of the whole instrument and, in
case of ambiguity, as viewed in the light of the surrounding circumstances.-1
The policy in question showed that the rates of premium were based on
the payroll of the employer-insured, computed in accordance with the risks
of physical injury inherent in the kinds of work in which his employees were
engaged. The computations were furnished by a state inspection rating
bureau, whose criteria were by statute the incidence of, and basis of exposure to, physical injuries in a given field of employment. Since the
parties must have been aware of these considerations, it would seem at least
questionable that their mutual intention when the contract was made included coverage of such non-physical injuries as defamation of character
or reputation. It is perhaps also relevant to note that writers in discussing
employers' liability insurance appear to consider it as designed to cover
bodily injuries accidentally suffered. 1 2 Furthermore the court specifically
excluded from consideration the workmen's compensation clause of the
policy. It was therefore impossible to view clearly the real issue which
the case seems to present: how far the second insuring clause of the policy
was intended to extend beyond the coverage provided by the first clause,
which was concerned exclusively with risks under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The purpose of the workmen's compensation laws is to
protect the worker from the rigors of loss or reduction of earning power
as a result of a disabling work injury.' 3 Therefore "personal injury" as
used in the state acts and in insuring agreements based,on them has been
uniformly held to mean an injury to body or health which incapacitates the
worker, adversely affecting his earning capacity. 14 To give meaning to
the second clause, "personal injuries" must be given broader scope there
than it is given in the first clause. 15 Such an expansion might cover
slander or it might cover only bodily injuries other than those included in
workmen's compensation coverage. It is submitted that had the court given
due consideration to the relation of the two insuring clauses and tb the
significance of the basis for computation of premiums, as means of determining the intent of the parties, an .opposite and perhaps sounder conclusion
would have been reached.
11. 44 C.J.S. § 291, p. 1146 (1945). In Soukop v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., 341 Mo. 614, 108 S.W.2d 86 (1937), the court held that the words "personal injury" as used in a policy identical to the one in the instant case presented
an ambiguity.
12. See Coucir, INsURANcE § 24 (1931) ; VANcF, INsURA cE § 275 (2d ed. 1930).
13. Riesenfeld, Forty Years of American Workmen's Compensation, 35 MInxx.
L. REv. 525, 529, 530 (1951); Campbell, Basic Principles of Workien's Compensation, 20 Miss. LJ. 117 (1948).
14. Galuzzo v. State, 111 Conn. 188, 149 Atl. 778 (1930); Heflin v. Red Front
Stores, 225 Ind. 517, 75 N.E.2d 662 (1947); McCauley v. Imperial Woolen Co., 261

Pa. 312, 104 Atl. 617 (1918).
15. Soukop v. Employer's Liability Assurance Corp., supra note 11.
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Should insurers become anxious upon noting the decision of this court,
they need only add "defamation and non-physical injuries" to the limiting
provisions in future employer's liability policies. As to policies currently
in effect, it appears that employer's liability policies are normally issued
for one year, thus providing to the insurer an early opportunity for adding
a limiting provision if desired; more immediate change could be effected by
cancellation of current policies, under the condition in the standard policy
granting either party the right to cancel upon ten days' notice, and issuance
of revised forms. If the foregoing analysis of the case is correct, such additional limitation would not arouse undue excitement on the part of employers in any event. Although not a milestone in insurance law, this case
represents an interesting approach by a court to a novel problem in the
insurance field.

JuRY TRIAL-FoRFEITuRE PROCEEDINGS-RIGHT OF A LIENOR TO

VEHIcLE-Appellant, the chattel mortgagee of an automobile seized by the state for allegedly transporting marihuana in violation of the California Health and Safety Code," unsuccessfully sought a jury trial in the forfeiture proceedings 2 to protect its lien
on the vehicle. On appeal, denial of jury trial was held to constitute reversible error, since at common law prior to the adoption of the California constitution jury trial was granted in cases of forfeiture. The court ruled
that the right exists even though appellant's attempt to establish and foreclose his lien ordinarily would only be cognizable in an equitable proceeding.
People v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe, 231 P.2d 832 (Cal. 1951).
It is almost axiomatic that the right to a trial by jury, guaranteed by
the federal constitution and those of the -several states, refers to those substantive actions at common law in which there was a right to jury trial.3
That a legislature creates new opportunity for litigation or a new offense is
generally not in itself enough to deprive parties falling within the purview
of such an act from the right to jury trial where a substantially similar
class of actions, differing only in form, already embodies that right. Forfeiture proceedings were long known in the common law as adjuncts to
the trade and maritime laws, 4 and as an operation of the sovereign police
JuRY TRIAL IN ACTION TO FORFEIT

1. CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 11610 (Deering, 1941).
2. CAL. HEALTH AND SA=~rY CoDE § 11620 (Deering, 1941): "The claimant of
any right, title or interest in the vehicle may prove his lien, mortgage or conditional
sales contract to be bona fide, and that his right, title or interest was created after
a reasonable investigation of the moral responsibility, character and reputation of the
purchaser, and without any knowledge that the vehicle was being, or was to be, used
for the purpose charged."
3. See Baltimore & Carolina Line v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1934);
Dimick v. Scheidt, 293 U.S. 474, 485 (1934). The rule is the same in the several
states.
4. See C. J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 137, 152-154 (1943) for a full statement of the derivation of these proceedings.
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power; in these proceedings the right to jury trial was recognized. 5 The
forfeitures themselves took two forms: (1) criminal action against an
individual felon for forfeiture of his property; (2) civil action (in rem)
against an offending article itself as defendant.6 The latter class of forfeitures, the legislative or statutory forfeiture, has remained, a particularly
effective weapon of sovereign power. 7 Its proceedings vary with the nature
of the article that offends. A distinction is drawn between articles incapable
-of lawful use, i.e., contraband or what the state may declare to be a nuisahce,8 and articles whose possession is normally lawful but under certain
circumstances may become unlawful, as in the instant case. As to the first
category, there rests in the state the power to forfeit with no right in interested parties to a jury trial, since the action to abate a nuisance is in
equity.9 Where the res is an article of the second group, the derivation of
the forfeiture action indicates that this is an action at law. Accordingly,
there is a right to jury trial at least to the extent of the interest of the party
in whose possession the res was at the time of the offense. 10
The rights of a lienor to jury trial in forfeiture proceedings of the
second category depends essentially on how the court will construe his
interest. Under one approach, that taken by the dissent in the instant
case, the lienor by intervention in the forfeiture proceedings is merely
seeking to establish and foreclose his lien. This view sees a distinct difference between the position of the party in possession of the offendirig
article or its owner, and that of the lienor. The lienor, even though he
participates in the forfeiture proceedings, in asserting his lien is pursuing
an action cognizable only in equity,'- and for which there is no right to a
trial by jury. This view, however, assumes that the forfeiture proceedings
5. 3 Br- Comm. *259.
6. 4 N.Y.U.L. REv. 84 (1927).

7. "It is not unknown or indeed uncommon in the law to visit upon the owner
of property the unpleasant consequences of the unauthorized action of one to whom
he has entrusted it. . . . The law thus builds a secondary defense against a forbidden use and precludes evasions by dispensing with the necessity of judicial inquiry
as to collusion between the wrongdoer and the alleged innocent owner." Van Oster
v. Kansas, 272 U. S. 465, 467 (1926).
8. Contraband: State v. Kelly, 57 Mont. 123, 187 Pac. 637 (1920); State v.
Intoxicating Liquor, 55 Vt. 82 (1883). Nuisance: State v. Lee, 113 Kan. 462, 215
Pac. 299 (1923) ; Furth v. State, 72 Ark. 161, 72 S.W. 759 (1904). But the power
of the legislature to declare an article a nuisance has in some jurisdictions been
limited by the courts: Colon v. Lisk, 153 N.Y. 188, 47 N.E. 302 (1897) ; State v. 1920
Studebaker Touring Car, 120 Ore. 254, 251 Pac. 701 (1926) ; Doc and Bill Furniture
Co. v. State, 83 Okla. 128, 200 Pac. 868 (1921). However, where a state does have
power to declare an article a nuisance, it does not violate due process. See Van
Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926) ; Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1893).
9. 5 POMEROY, EQuITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1941 (4th ed. 1919).
10. Despite the origins of the forfeiture proceeding, there have been unsupported
dicta declaring it to be equitable in nature. See Traffic Sales Co. v. Justice's Court,
192 Cal. 377, 384, 220 Pac. 306, 309 (1923), followed in People v. One 1941 Mercury
Sedan, 74 Cal.App.2d 199, 202, 168 P.2d 443, 445 (1946) ; People v. One 1941 Chrysler
Sedan, 81 Cal.App.2d 18, 30, 183 P.2d 368, 376 (1947).

11. C.I.T. Corp. v. United States, 37 F.2d 590 (10th Cir. 1930); Missouri Inv.
Corp. v. United States, 32 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1929). But cf. United States v. Yamoto,
50 F. 2d 599 (9th Cir. 1931).
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and the establishment and 'foreclosure of the lien are essentially distinct
and separate actions. 2 It overlooks the fact that the action of the lienor
arises not independently of the forfeiture, but out of and because of it.
This suggests a second approach: assertion of the lienor's interest should
be controlled by the forfeiture proceedings. Distinctions made in the kinds
of interest overlook the real problem: the nature of the forfeiture action
itself. While it is true that the formal nature of the proceeding is in rem,
directed against the article and not the individuals possessing an interest
in it,"3 the purpose of the action actually is to examine and determine the
extent of those interests. The court acquires jurisdiction over all interests
in the res and does not distinguish between owner and lienholder, 14 for
the nature of each interest is unimportant. The instant case correctly rejects different trial treatment for each party.

LABoR-NATIONAL

LABOR RELATIONS ACT---"STRIKE

SENIORITY"

PRAcTIcE-During an economic strike,' an employer
was able to recommence operations by hiring new employees and taking
back some of the strikers. After the strike he took back the remaining
strikers, but altered his old seniority plan by instituting a "strike seniority"
policy whereby employees who had stayed on strike would in the future be
laid off ahead of those who had worked during the strike. Within each
group, however, the old seniority plan remained unchanged. Upon a charge
brought by the union, the NLRB held the strike seniority policy to be an
unfair labor practice under the National Labor Relations Act 2 and ordered
the employer to cease and desist from maintaining it.8 The Board's petition for enforcement was denied by the Circuit Court of Appeals, which
based its decision on the Mackay Radio doctrine 4 that, in case of an
economic strike, an employer may hire replacements for strikers and assure
AS AN

UNFAIR

LABOR

12. See dissent in instant case at 846; see note 11 supra.

13. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921); Dobbins
Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395 (1871).
14. There was an apparent difference in the position of owner and lienor under
but this was
remedied with the passage of the Repeal and Enforcement Act, 49 STAT. 878 (1935)
as amended, 62 STAT. 840, 18 U.S.C. §3617(b) (Supp. 1951).

Section 26 of the National Prohibition Act, 41 STAT. 315 (1919),

1. An "economic strike" is a strike for purposes other than resisting an employer's unfair labor practices. See NLRB v. A. Sartorius & Co., 140 F.2d 203 (2d

Cir. 1944).
2. 49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. §158(3) (1946), as amended, 61 STAT.
140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (Supp. 1949) :"It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . (3) By discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of

employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization."

3. Potlatch Forests, Inc., 87 N.L.R.B. 1193 (1949).
4. See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-346 (1938).
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them permanency of employment in order to tontinue his operations, and
that such replacements need not be discharged to make room for strikers
if there are not enough jobs to go around when the strike is ended. It
was held that, in the absence of any other evidence of a discriminatory
motive, 5 strike seniority is a necessary incident to the right to hire replacements. NLRB v. Potlatch Forests,Inc., 189 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1951).
The National Labor Relations Act provides no specific seniority rights,
and an employer may adopt any non-discriminatory seniority plan. 6 However, it is an unfair labor practice to lay off union men because of their
union membership, and in such a case an order to reinstate them without
prejudice to seniority will be enforced. 7 Even if union men are laid off
upon an established seniority basis during a work shortage, they must be
reinstated if the employer's prior course of conduct shows that anti-union
discrimination was the real motivating factor behind the lay-offs. s As in
the present case, NLRB v. Sandy Hill Iron & Brass Works 9 concerned
pre-strike employees who worked during strikes and received preference
over strikers in regard to holding their jobs during work shortages. In
that case, however, circumstantial evidence of a discriminatory motive led
the court to affirm the Board's finding of an unfair labor practice.10 In
Wilson & Co., Inc. v. NLRB," a longstanding seniority policy was aban5. The Board has broad discretion to remedy the effects of an unfair labor
practice. Where the strike is not solely "economic," and the issues include an alleged unfair labor practice, the Board may order reinstatement of strikers without
prejudice to seniority in order to restore the pre-strike situation. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATION S Act, 49 STAT. 453 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1946), as amended, 61
STAT. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (Supp. 1949); Polish National Alliance v.
NLRB, 136, F.2d 175 (7th Cir. 1943), aff'd, 322 U.S. 643 (1943); NLRB v. Star
Pub. Co., 97 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1938) ; cf. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 114 F.2d
820 (3d Cir. 1940) (eligibility for paid vacation during year of strike). These cases
were distinguished in the instant case on the ground that no 'employer unfair labor
practices were among the strike issues here. It is well settled that replaced strikers
may not be ordered to be reinstated in the absence of an employer unfair labor practice. Sax v. NLRB, 171 F.2d 769 (7th Cir. 1948) ; NLRB v. Lightner Pub. Co. of
Illinois, 113 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1940); cf. NLRB. v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332
(1939) ; see NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., spra note 4.
6. See Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. NLRB, 111 F.2d 340 (8th Cir. 1940).
7. NLRB v. Vail Mfg. Co., 158 F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 331 U.S.
835 (1947), rehearing denied, 332 U.S. 826 (1947) ; Kansas City Power & Light Co.
v. N.L.R.B., vupra note 6; cf. NLRB v. Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills, 180 F.2d 68
(10th Cir. 1950); NLRB v. National Garment Co., 166 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1948)
(back pay alone ordered).
8. NLRB v. Vail Mfg. Co., supra note 7; cf. Wells, Inc. v. NLRB, 162 F.2d 457
(9th Cir. 1947).
9. 165 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1947). Business had slackened just as a strike ended,
necessitating a reduction in working force, and the strikers received discharge notices
as they reported to go back to work. The number of strikers discharged to make
this reduction was extremely large as compared to the number of non-strikers discharged. Operations had continued during the strike, but none of the strikers had
been replaced. An order for the reinstatement of the discharged strikers without
prejudice to seniority was enforced by the court.
10. Prior to the strike, the employer had manifested to its employees its antiunion attitude. Id. at 662. The Board found that the real reasons for the discharges
were to penalize the strikers for striking, 69 N.L.R.B. 355, 374 (1946), and to influence a coming collective bargaining election. Id. at 372.
11. 120 F.2d 913, 924 (7th Cir. 1941).
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doned at the end of an economic strike during which the strikers were
2
largely replaced and the replacements promised permanent employment.'
It was field that this change did not make out a case of illegal discrimination. While replacements did not get seniority over strikers as in the
present case, nevertheless the strikers lost their old seniority and, therefore, some degree of job security. The instant case goes one step further
in holding that seniority preference for replacements is not, in itself, a discrimination against strikers. However, in situations where the legitimate
motive of attempting to continue operations could not exist, because the
favored non-strikers did not work during the strike,' 3 it would seem that
strike seniority will be held to be an illegal discrimination without further
evidence.
It is often desirable, for various business reasons, 14 for an employer
to take back replaced strikers if he possibly can. This makes the position
of a replacement more tenuous than that of a new worker in a non-struck
plant. Replacements desire assurance from their employer that they will
not be fired at the end of the strike and replaced with returned strikers,
and for the same reason they desire strike seniority as a guarantee that the
employer will not accomplish the same result by his lay-off seniority
system. Because there is a strike, the replacements are in a good bargaining position. From this point' of view strike seniority for the purpose
of attracting replacements and staying in business is a logical corollary of
the Mackay Radio doctrine. 15 There can be little doubt, however, that
the present decision will have an adverse effect on the economic strength
of unions, as strike seniority tends to keep a struck plant in operation,
making it more difficult for a union to win a strike. While unions may be
more cautious in the future in calling economic strikes, the decision should
have little effect upon the attitude of the unions' rank and file toward participating in a strike, since economic strikers have faced the risk of being
replaced and losing their jobs ever since the Mackay Radio doctrine was
announced-a far graver risk than loss of seniority.
12. Id. at 920.
13. See General Electric Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 510 (1948); Precision Castings Co.,
48 N.L.R.B. 870 (1943).
14. E.g., the strikers may be more skilled than the replacements; the strikers
have more experience at the employer's plant than the replacements; there may be
an increase in business after a strike necessitating an increase in working force; the
strikers may constitute a large segment of the available workers in the local labor
market; it may be desirable to take back strikers in order to placate the union and
avoid future labor troubles; taking back strikers will help to retore any community
goodwill which may have been lost during the strike.
15. Strikers who cross picket lines want seniority over new employees, so that
when the employer gives new employees strike seniority, he must give strikers strike
seniority, too, as did the employer in the instant case. However, when no new
employees are hired during the strike, the employer need not give strike seniority to
strikers who cross the picket lines in order to satisfy their desire for job security, as
he may give them job security simply by continuing his old seniority plan under
which these employees already had seniority. This is a further basis for distinction
between the present case and the Sandy Hill case, srupra note 9, where no, new employees hired during the strike were involved.
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PRACTICE OF LAW-TAXATION-UNAUTH oRIZED PRACTICE OF IN-

comE TAx LAw BY LAYEN-For a cash consideration, defendant, a layman who advertised himself as an "Income Tax Expert" and a "Tax Consultant," prepared an income tax return for a client and gave him professional advice on the solution of several complex legal questions related to
the return.' The members of a county bar association committee on the
unauthorized and illegal practice of law brought an action to enjoin defendant perpetually from further engaging in the unauthorized practice of
law and to adjudge him in contempt of court therefor. On appeal from
an order of the lower court denying defendant's motion for a new trial,
the order was affirmed, the court holding that the resolution by defendant

of difficult or doubtful legal problems in connection with the preparation
of an income tax return for another for a consideration constituted the
practice of law. Gardnerv. Conway, 48 N.W.2d 788 (Minn. 1951).
Courts have consistently held the practice of law by laymen to be
illegal. The justification is the need for protection of the public from advice
and representation in legal matters by incompetent and unreliable persons
over whom the judiciary would have little control.2 But the courts live
never been able to agree on an answer to the question of what constitutes
the practice of law.8 Examination of statutes, judicial decisions, and departmental rulings, and the rendering of an opinion thereon has been said
to be the practice of law.4 So has the advising of another as to his legal
rights and the methods to be used for enforcing them.5 One test has
been whether an act requires use of legal knowledge or skill. 6 It is
1. The questions answered by defendant, whose training consisted primarily of a
grade school education and three years of experience as a United States deputy
collector of internal revenue, were:
"(a) Whether the taxpayer, who himself had exclusive control of the operation
of the truck farm, was in partnership with his wife, who had contributed one-half
of the purchase price, who helped with the work, and who received one-half of the
profits.
"(b) Whether the taxpayer was entitled to claim his wife as an exemption, since
he had never been ceremonially married, though maintaining a common-law -marriage
status.
"(c) Whether the taxpayer should file his separate return and advise his socalled common-law wife. to file a separate return.
"(d) Whether certain money expended on improvements of buildings on the
truck farm was deductible from his earnings.
"(e) Whether a certain produce loss sustained by frost and subsequent flood was
a deductible item."
Instant case at 792.
2. See Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 176, 180, 52 N.E.2d 27, 31 (1943).
3. For definitions and cases, see 151 A.L.R. 781 (1944); 33 WoRDs AND
Other cases are collected in A.B.A., COMPENDIUm ON UNPHRASES 193 (1940).
AUTHORIZED PRAcricE or LAW 50 (1942).
4. Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 176, 183, 52 N.E.2d 27, 33 (1943).
5. People v. Goodman, 366 Ill. 346, 8 N.E.2d 941, cert. denied, 302 U.S. 728
(1937); Fitchette v. Taylor, 191 Minn. 582, 254 N.W. 910 (1934).
6. People v. Stock Yards Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 176 N.E. 901 (1931) ; see Gazan v.
Heery, 183 Ga. 30, 38, 187 S.E. 371, 376 (1936).
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not necessary that a layman receive compensation to be guilty of unauthorized practice of law.7 However, such criteria have been of little help
in dissolving the confusion in the field of income taxation, where legal
and accounting problems are inescapably tied together. The determination
of income is an accounting function, but at the same time, the computation
of what part of income is taxable depends upon interpretation of statutes,
as modified by court decisions and Treasury Department rulings, as well
as upon the resolution of non-tax legal problems which may have an effect
on the tax issues. Even the simplest tax return requires some consideration
of the law, although it has been held that a layman is not practicing law
when he prepares returns of the least difficult kind.8 It is the more complicated tax returns, which involve such specialized accounting concepts
as depreciation and inventory pricing methods, that cause difficulty. There
would seem to be no question that the public interest can best be servedby having such returns prepared by accountants who are equipped by
training and experience to handle these problems, rather than by lawyers,
many of whom have little knowledge of. accounting. But these are also
the returns that raise the more difficult legal issues, which only a lawyer
is'properly equipped to handle. The most specific line to be drawn appeared in the case of In re Bercu,9 where the court held that the giving of
income tax advice on questions of law not incidental to the preparation of
a tax return or to accounting work in connection with a return was the
practice of law. Thus, if the legal advice had been incidental to other
service, it would not have been practice of law. This was a workable distinction which was easy to apply. However, it is rejected by the court
in the instant case because "the incidental test ignores the interest of the
public as the controlling determinant." 10 Considering that the primary
concern is protection of the public from incompetent and unreliable service
on legal matters, it is difficult to understand how the resolution of a legal
question by a layman is any more reliable when made in connection with
the preparation of a tax return than when made independently of a return."
The instant case presents a far more realistic approach to the problem.
The court looks to the nature of the service performed, rather than the
circumstances surrounding that service, to ascertain whether it constituted
7. State v. Hunter, 133 Neb. 625, 276 N.W. 380 (1937). However, courts in
some jurisdictions have held, on the basis of statutory definitions, that a layman must
receive compensation to be guilty of unauthorized practice. See, e.g., Paul v. Stanley,
168 Wash. 371, 12 P.2d 401 (1932) (statute made it unlawful for laymen to do work
of legal nature for compensation).
8. Lowell Bar Ass'n. v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 176, 52 N.E.2d 27 (1943); Blair v.
Motor Carriers' Service, 40 Pa. D.&C. 413, 429 (1939).
9. 273 App. Div. 524, 78 N.Y.S.2d 209 (1st Dep't 1948), aff'd, 299 N.Y. 728,

87 N.E.2d 451 (1949).
10. Instant case at 796.
11. Austin, Relations Between Lawyers and Certified Public Accountants in Income Tax Practice,36 IowA L. Rav. 227, 235 (1951).
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the unauthorized practice of law. The court's test of a difficult or doubtful
question of law recognizes that the lawyer is the only one especially trained
to handle 'such problems, and that it is therefore in the public interest that
others be enjoined from engaging in such practice . 2 No attempt is made
to define precisely what constitutes such a legal problem. Nor are the
legal questions which defendant assumed to answer of much help, 13 for they
are of such an extreme nature that a certified public accountant, as a matter
of sound policy, would not venture to answer them.1 4 So the concept is
left as a broad rule to be applied to the particular facts of each case, and
not to be used as a general solution to the overall problem. It is submitted
that no more precise line can be drawn.
The answer to the problem can best be reached by methods other than
through the courts. Lawyers and certified public accountants are already
taking steps for further mutual understanding and cooperation in defining
the proper areas of practice in federal tax matters.' 5 But a large number
of laymen who engage in income tax work are neither certified public accountants nor lawyer and in many cases are not even trained in accounting.
These are the individuals who are most likely to engage in unauthorized
practice of law and who have been the cause of the most troublesome litigations in this field.' 6 A partial solution might be legislation requiring that
income tax returns, other than the most elementary ones, be prepared only
by lawyers or accountants who hold licenses indicating a minimum proficiency in the field. There is authority to the effect that such legislation
might be held unconstitutional,' 7 but it could probably be justified as
reasonably necessary for proper protection of the public welfare. However,
the best prospect of success would seem to be education of the general
public to the dangers of poor advice. No amount of cooperation between
lawyers and public accountants will provide a lasting solution unless the
taxpayer, who creates the problem by seeking aid, is made conscious of the
benefit to him of taking his tax problems to reputable individuals who are
equipped by training to cope with them.
12. For an example of injury to a taxpayer who relied on legal advice given
by a layman, see Hermax v. Comm'r, 11 T.C. 442 (1948), where reliance by a taxpayer on the advice of an accountant was held no defense to a tax penalty.
13. See note 1 supra.
14. Levy, The Scope and Liinitatioiisof Accountants' Practice in Federal Income
Taxation, 89 J. ACcOUNTANCY 470, 479 (1950).
15. See Statement of PrinciplesRelating to Practicein the Field of Federal Incone Taxation Promulgated by the National Conference of Lawyers and Certified
Public Accountants, 91 J. AccouNTANcY 869 (1951).
16. Austin, Relations Between Lawyers and Certified Public Accountants in
Income Tax Prdctice, 36 IowA L. REv. 227, 243 (1951).
17. See Moore v. Grillis, 205 Miss. 865, 39 So.2d 505 (1949), where a court held
unconstitutional a state statute which prohibited anyone other than a certified public
accountant or a lawyer from receiving compensation "for making or preparing any
tax return," on the ground that the statute was arbitrarily discriminatory and with-

out reasonable relation to the advancement of public welfare.
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WORNMEN'S COmPENSATIoN-FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACTS
-STATE STATUTORY PROVISION FOR WAIVER-OF FEDERAL JURISDICTIONACCORD AND SATISFACTION VS. SUBSTITUTED CONTRACT AS BAR TO FEDERAL

CAUSE OF ACTION-An employee of a railroad terminal in New York sustained injuries in a fall from his employer's locomotive. The employee
agreed to forego suit and to accept voluntary compensation from the employer in accordance with the New York Workmen's Compensation Law.
When the question of New York jurisdiction over an injury apparently
within the purview of the Federal Employers' Liability Acts was brought
to a hearing by the New York Board, both parties purported to waive the
lack of jurisdiction in accordance with § 113 of the New York Law which
provides that the Board may proceed in cases of injuries covered by federal
law "in case the claimant, the employer and the insurance carrier waive
. .
interstate commerce rights and remedies...
" 1 Thereupon the
employee was awarded the maximum rate, to continue weekly until further
determination by the Board. Six months after the accident, the employer
raised the issue of claimant's recovery and ability to work, whereupon
claimant retained counsel who obtained continued, but reduced, compensation. After two years of continued payments, and fifteen months of representation by counsel, the employee brought suit in the district court against
the employer, asserting a cause of action under the federal statutes. It
was contended that claimant should be relieved from his "waiver" because
he was mistaken as to his federal rights, and, in any event, since there had
been no final award by the Board, there was no satisfaction and the accord
was merely executory. It was held that the claimant's conduct was a bar
to his federal claim. Heagney v.Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal, 190
F.2d 967 (2d Cir. 1951).
To the extent that the federal acts cover the liability of an employer
to his employee, they are exclusive of all state remedies. A state statute
may not alter or limit such employee's rights,2 and any "contract, rule,
regulation, or device whatsoever" to exempt the employer from liability
under the federal acts is void. 3 However, parties may contract to settle,
release, or compromise such claims, thereby discharging the employer from
such liability. 4 Therefore, whether § 113 is operative to confer jurisdiction
on the New York Board depends upon the effectiveness of the purported
waiver of the federal cause of action. Prior to the enactment of § 113,
the question whether an agreement to accept awards of the New York
Board was a bar to a federal claim was treated by the New York Court
of Appeals in terms of accord and satisfaction. Such a contract has been
1. NEW YORK WORKMEN'S

bk. 64, § 113 (Mcinney, 1946).

COMPENSATION LAW

§ 113, N.Y. CoNsoL.

LAWS,

2. N.Y. Central R.R v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147 (1917); see also Knickerbocker
Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920).
3. FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LlAuuiLry Acr § 5, 35 STAT. 66 (1908), 45 U.S.C. § 55

(1946).
4. Callen v. Pennsylvania R.R., 332 U.S. 625 (1948).
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based either upon a written agreement or upon the conduct of the parties
in submitting themselves to the Board and making and accepting payments
in accord with awards rendered. In Brassel v. Electric Welding Co., there
was no agreement to be construed, but the acceptance of the Board's final
award was held a bar to the original federal claim. 5 It was said that the
facts 6onstituted an "accord and satisfaction" and "estoppel by consent."
Under similar facts, acceptance of partial awards was held not a bar, but
merely an executory accord.8 Though the New York Court of Appeals
has never passed upon the. effect of § 113 in such cases, decisions of the
lower courts, which have sustained a bar to actions brought after acceptance
of Board awards, have merely cited the section and sometimes added reference to "estoppel," 7 without any analysis of the contractual elements which
are clearly essential to the operation of the waiver clause. Consequently,
the New York precedents were of little aid to the court in determining the
contractual consequences in the instant case.
In the area of accord and satisfaction, release, discharge and compromise contracts courts tend to cite precedents and quote dogma without
adequate analysis of the new factual situation.8 An executory accord is
an agreement to accept in the future a stated performance in discharge or
satisfaction of an existing claim. Consequently, there is no discharge until
the bargained for performance is rendered in full.9 In contrast with the
accord contract, parties may agree to substitute the new agreement for the
existing claim. However, such contracts have frequently become entangled
in the dogma of accord and satisfaction. If the obligee agrees to accept
the obligor's promise to perform the agreed upon substitute, as differentiated fromi the performance of the promise, in discharge of the existing
claim, then the obligee's original claim is immediately barred by the agreement without executed performance. 10 When this distinction is kept clearly
in mind, much of the confusion in the language of accord and satisfaction
vanishes. It is reasonable to charge the parties with knowledge of the
statutory provisions." The parties' conduct, in view of § 11 of the New
York Law that such remedy is exclusive, coupled with § 113 that resort to
5. 239 N.Y. 78, 145 N.E. 745 (1924).
6. Fitzgerald v. Harbor Lighterage Co., 244 N.Y. 132, 155 N.E. 74 (1926).
7. See Ahem v. So. Buffalo Ry., 277 App. Div. 1067, 100 N.Y.S.2d 639 (1950);
Haglund v. Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co., 255 App. Div. 895, 7 N.Y.S.2d 465
(1938) ; Kane v. Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co., 250 App. Div. 888, 295 N.Y. Supp.
118 (1937).
8. See cases cited supra note 7; Archibald McNeil & Sons Co. v. United States,
1 F.2d 39 (1924), aff'd, 10 F.2d 1016 (3d Cir. 1926) (wherein the court went off on
a discussion of contractual consideration). The dissent in the instant case contents
itself with the argument that New York courts have -not found a bar until acceptance
of a final award, because until then the accord is merely executory.
9. RESTATEmENT, CoNTRAcrs § 417 (1932); CoRDix, CoNTRAcTs § 1268 (19.1);
See Reilly v . Barrett, 220 N.Y. 170, 115 N.E. 453 (1917).
10. RESTATEmENT, CoNTRtcrs § 418 (1932); CoaINm, CoNmAcrs §§ 1268, 1269,
1293 (1951) ; cf. Moers v. Moers, 229 N.Y. 294, 128 N.E. 202 (1920)) ; Castelli v.
Tolibia, 83 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1948).
11. Brassel v. Electric Welding Co., 239 N.Y. 78, 145 N.E. 745 (1924).
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the Board depends upon a waiver of any federal remedy, suggests that the
reasonable expectation is that the submission to the Board is in substitution of any existing claim. After fifteen months of representation by
counsel, it is too late to allege ignorance or mistake as to federal rights
in avoidance of this contract. 12 Although the instant decision does not
dearly spell it out, this is apparently the construction adopted. Only on this
analysi§ is the decision correct because, if what the parties more reasonably
contemplated was an agreement whereby the employee was to relinquish
his federal claim only upon completed performance of the agreed upon substitute, the holding of bar would be error. In that case, until default by
the employer in performance of his promise to comply with Board awards,
the employee's federal claim should be only temporarily suspended, because
a bar is res judicata, and, if the employer thereafter defaulted, it would be
contrary to the contractual expectations to leave the employee to a suit on
the employer's new promise only. Upon such default, the employee should
then have an election to sue upon either claim. At least, accepting the
instant case on the above analysis, it clarifies not only the operation of § 113,
but also, to some extent, the law of accord and satisfaction by giving recognition to the oft-forgotten fundamental that the reasonable expectations
of the parties control the contract.
12. In the instant case, knowledge of his attorney was imputed to the claimant.

